Rejoinder to Igor Wysocki on Brain Death by Dominiak, Łukasz
89
Łukasz Dominiak
Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu





The present text is a rejoinder to Igor 
Wysocki’s rejoinder published in Political 
Dialogues 20 to Dominiak & Szczęsny’s 
paper Brain Death in Japan: A Critical 
Approach.
Keywords: philosophy, brain death, iden-
tity, bioethics
Słowa kluczowe: filozofia, śmierć mózgu, 
tożsamość, bioetyka
1. Rejoinder to Wysocki’s “An 
Alternative to Essentialist Theories”
Let me straightaway start with a bit of ad 
hominem. Apparently, Wysocki does not 
seriously want to propose any alternative 
to essentialist theories of identity by 
replying to the same Dominiak a few 
years after the original publication by the 
latter. That would be like performatively 
contradicting himself – he obviously 
assumes that there is the same person 
(Dominiak) over time, while arguing to the 
contrary. But there is more to this than 
just discussing with the same author 
over time. Wysocki really thinks that 
Psychological Account is an alternative 
to essentialist theories. Not to my mind, 
at least. Look, on Psychological Account 
of Personal Identity – that is the full name 
– there is some K (a genus proximum) of 
a given person, namely personhood as the 
substance-sortal category. A necessary 
condition for a given person, let’s call 
him Mark, to be the same person over 
time is to belong to the substance-sortal 
category of persons. If Mark ceases to be 
a person, he perforce ceases to be Mark. 
In turn, a sufficient condition for Mark 
to be the same person over time is to 
be a person psychologically continuous 
with himself over a given time span. If 
Mark, all the time being a person, ceases 
to be psychologically continuous with 
himself at some earlier date, he perforce 
ceases to be Mark but not to be a person. 
There is therefore no wonder Wysocki 
himself concedes that Psychological 
Account is not so much an alternative to 
essentialist accounts as a kind thereof 
when he writes: “Generally, to be able 
to study personal identity over time, we 
need some minimal conception of what 
a person or an individual is”. If this is not 
essentialism, what is it? Psychological 
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Account of Personal Identity is not an 
alternative to essentialism but a kind 
of essentialism, namely reductionist 
essentialism. Essentialism can be 
reductionist or non-reductionist. The 
former posits that we are subsumed 
under some substance but that our 
individual identity is reducible to some 
other relations like e.g. psychological 
continuity. The latter claims that we are 
subsumed under some substance but 
that our individual identity is irreducible 
to anything else. It looks to me that 
Wysocki took the non-reductionist 
essentialism for all essentialisms, 
committing himself to a peculiar 
philosophical synecdoche, and tried to 
impute it to Dominiak. If that is the case, 
it seems he presented no alternative to 
essentialist theories1. 
Hence, this is true that “according to 
Dominiak, K (a genus proximum) of a given 
person is some substance (…) a brain, 
embodied mind, human organism”, 
but so is it for Wysocki: a person. For 
instance, for Wysocki an individual, we 
call him Mark, also is some substance, 
namely a self-aware bodily entity 
customarily labelled a person. So, also 
for Wysocki “generally speaking, the logic 
is as follows: if e is of a kind K, K being 
a specifi cally organized substance, then 
whenever K ceases to be instantiated in 
e, e is no more”. The only thing we should 
do is to substitute person for K and here 
we go. And I am sure there is no escape 
for Wysocki, because otherwise he would 
be committed to a claim that whenever 
K ceases to be instantiated in e, e can 
still be there, which can be translated 
into whenever e ceases to be a person,
1 On substance-sortal vs phase-sortal and on 
reductionist vs non-reductionist accounts of iden-
tity see: J. McMahan, The Ethics of Killing: Prob-
lems at the Margins of Life, Oxford University Press, 
New York 2002, p. 5–6.
e can still exist. An idiosyncratic account 
of personal identity, forsooth. 
By the same token it is indeed 
diffi cult to see why “on the grounds of 
Psychological Account death wouldn’t 
mean the momentaneous cessation of the 
workings of some essential substance”? 
At some point in time a given person 
ceases to be psychologically continuous 
with himself and because, as we know 
due to Parfi t2, psychological continuity 
is not a matter of degree (contrary to 
psychological connectedness), what 
would it be if not momentaneous? 
Apparently, it would not be spectacular, 
I suppose, but still, it would be effectuated 
in a blink of an eye. And obviously that 
would be cessation of the workings of 
some essential substance or better to say 
of essential identity of this very person. 
So, to conclude this section, I cannot 
see any alternative to essentialist 
theories being successfully proposed by 
Wysocki in his current reply, although 
I know he has some unplayed trumps up 
his sleeve. 
2. Rejoinder to Wysocki’s “Throwing 
Doubt on Essentialism as Such and 
a Fortiori Essentialist Theories of 
Identity”
As to the opening antiessentialist 
argument – “Essentialists claim that for 
the individual I to exist over time is to 
remain of the kind K (K being I’s genus 
proximum). Yet, belonging to some (and 
not the other) kind is determined by 
I’s essential properties. And now, if we 
investigate I’s properties what means 
can we resort to when determining I’s 
essential properties other than pointing 
to I’s genus proximum? It seems to be 
2 D. Parfi t, Reasons and Persons, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford 1986, passim.
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an insuperable obstacle in the form of 
circulus vitiosus: I’s genus proximum is 
K because of such and such essential 
properties E’s. And why does I have the 
essential properties E’s (and not any 
other set of properties)? Because they 
are determined by I’s genus proximum. 
It looks as though we haven’t started 
and we are running in circles” – I sadly 
concede it might be right, although I will 
venture to derail it.
There can be some properties of 
things, particularly of persons, that are 
impossible to deny argumentatively. 
For instance, a property of being an 
actor, a property of being a self-owner 
or a property of having free will are 
impossible to deny without falling thereby 
into performative contradiction:3 arguing 
that I am not an actor would be itself an 
act; arguing that you do not have a free 
will would be giving you reasons for free 
acceptance or dismissal, presupposing 
thereby that you have a free will to take 
part in an argumentation etc. We can call 
all properties that are argumentatively 
unassailable, as well as all properties 
logically derivable therefrom, essential 
properties. “And now, if we investigate 
I’s properties what means can we 
resort to when determining I’s essential 
properties other than pointing to I’s 
genus proximum?” Well, pointing to their 
necessity, making a transcendental 
argument and avoiding circulus vitiosus. 
So, simply speaking, how do we know that 
some properties of a given individual are 
essential whereas other are accidental? 
By not being able to deny the former – 
they must be essential or if you claim 
otherwise, you are talking nonsense. 
3 See on this topic e.g. H.-H. Hoppe, Econom-
ics and Ethics of Private Property, Ludwig von Mises 
Institute, Auburn 2006, passim.
Or more generally, we can proceed 
aprioristically in a broader sense, i.e. 
also by stipulating or analytically refi ning 
a common parlance defi nition and only 
then checking which empirically existing 
entities actually have the properties 
stipulated in the defi nition. Then of 
course belonging to a given kind would 
be determined by I’s properties but not 
the other way round; we would simply 
call some of I’s properties essential but 
without suggesting that they are “really” 
or “metaphysically” essential properties. 
How good our stipulations are would be 
simply “recognized by their fruit”. 
3. Rejoinder to Wysocki’s “A Dying 
Patient Thought Experiment”
Before we get to the eponymous 
thought experiment, it is good to know 
my controversialist’s proclivities in 
advance, so that we can know where 
his conclusions come from. According to 
Wysocki, a proposal to “make it lawful 
to remove organs from living, precisely 
defi ned and indubitably diagnosed, 
anencephalic infants”4 is a “wonderfully 
insightful remark”. Well, tastes differ but 
his are telling indeed, aren’t they? From 
this wonderfully insightful point of view it 
is diffi cult to see why George’s diagnosis 
– “luckily Paul is a person and persons 
are minimally functional organisms; 
so, however miserable Paul might be 
now; thankfully, he is still alive” – is 
“overoptimistic”. According to Wysocki, 
Paul’s functional organs are there still up 
for harvest – not particularly comforting 
perspective, let alone an overoptimistic 
one. 
But seriously, Wysocki’s “main thrust
now is that the pronouncement of death
4 P. Singer, Rethinking Life and Death, Oxford 
University Press, New York 1995, p. 52.
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is not only descriptive but it also 
contains some ethical judgment”. Fair 
enough but let’s do some philosophy. 
“Contains” in what sense? According to 
Wysocki, “contains” means “a mixture 
of descriptive and normative language” 
and only from the normative part of this 
mixture follow “legal consequences”; and 
then “when the patient is found dead, 
their moral status change and ‘when’ in 
the previous clause is purely defi nitional 
and not consequential”, meaning that 
the patient’s moral status does not 
change because he has just died, rather 
the very pronouncement of his death is 
a pronouncement of already changed 
moral status: “the part of the meaning 
of death of a patient is that from now 
onwards the patient’s organs can be 
harvested”. But if that is the sense of 
“contains”, then it is diffi cult to see why 
Singer’s proposal to “make it lawful to 
remove organs from living (…) infants” 
is according to Wysocki a “wonderfully 
insightful remark”. For this proposal can 
then mean only one of the two things. 
Since according to Wysocki defi nition of 
death “contains” ethical judgment about 
what matters (and about permissibility 
of organ procurement) and is indeed 
a “mixture of descriptive and normative 
language” from which follow “legal 
consequences”, then Singer’s proposal to 
legalise organ procurement from infants 
who he admits are not dead (since “the 
meaning of death of a patient is that 
from now onwards the patient’s organs 
can be harvested”, then the meaning of 
being alive should be that the patient’s 
organs cannot be harvested, shouldn’t 
be?), is a proposal to introduce “legal 
consequences” that do not follow from 
the pronouncement of death and 
therefore from what matters; I do not 
think that Wysocki would like to defend 
legalisation of what does not matter. So, 
maybe the second option. Perhaps what 
Singer proposes is actually something 
different from what Wysocki suggests he 
proposes. It looks that Singer proposes 
to ignore the defi nition of death utterly 
and to stick to what matters exclusively. 
According to my reading of Singer this 
is exactly the case: let’s forget about the 
defi nition of death and focus solely on 
what matters (“instead of changing the 
defi nition of death so as to declare legally 
dead anencephalic infants and infants 
whose cortex had been destroyed, it 
would be better to make it lawful to 
remove organs from living, precisely 
defi ned and indubitably diagnosed, 
anencephalic infants whose cortexes 
have been destroyed”5). But it cannot be 
done if the defi nition of death “contains” 
ethical judgment about what matters 
as Wysocki wants it to – “cannot” in 
a logical meaning. So, either “wonderfully 
insightful remark” is callous or the 
defi nition of death does not contain any 
ethical judgment. Too bad for Wysocki.
It therefore seems that Wysocki is 
left with two possibilities. He can say 
that we should change the defi nition of 
death according to our changing moral 
judgments about what matters. But 
this he is unwilling to do. That would 
be “bizarre in the extreme”, since “the 
only real issue at stake is legal or ethical 
by nature” and “nothing changes in 
the reality” etc. Hence, he must say, 
following Singer, that we should forget 
about the defi nition of death and focus 
on what matters exclusively. That would 
of course require abandoning his original 
“mixed” understanding of the defi nition 
of death as partly descriptive and partly 
normative – but he is defeated in this 
respect anyway as we could see in the 
paragraph above. So, not a heavy loss 
5 P. Singer, Rethinking…p.52
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on his part anymore. And I could even 
concede that setting aside the defi nition 
of death and dealing only with what 
matters might be a viable strategy but 
how could it undermine essentialism 
I cannot see at all. Quite to the contrary, 
it seems that this strategy would have 
to assume essentialism to be operative. 
Eventually, there is some “what” in 
what matters that must have some 
particular nature, even if transitive, to be 
at all identifi able. There must be some 
investitive and divestitive facts – like 
births or deaths, or whatever – that give 
rise or extinguish legal consequences.
4. Rejoinder to Wysocki’s “Defl ating 
the Idea of Personal Identity from the 
Practical Vantage Point”
Wysocki writes: “How can it matter 
practically whether a given patient (as 
distinguished by the body lying in, say, 
the bed no.1) in a given hospital ward 
is the same patient over time or not? 
Practically speaking, the doctor deals 
with the spatio-temporally continuous 
body doing his or her best (…) In such 
practical cases, the question of identity 
seems superfl uous”. Well, I think it 
depends on the meaning of the word 
“practical”. If understood as “everyday 
life”, then obviously, no one, maybe 
besides some identity geeks, would 
bother at all. But if understood as 
“ethically” or “legally”, then there could 
be a whole lot of difference. One thing 
should put an end to the issue: consent. 
If the patient A at t1 in a given hospital 
ward and the patient B at t2 were not the 
same patients, then consent of patient 
A to be operated by the doctor would not 
be able to extinguish doctor’s duty not to 
operate on patient B. 
5. Rejoinder to Wysocki’s “The 
Qualitatively Identical vs Numerically 
Identical”
Wysocki’s argument that “Dominiak’s 
seemingly impeccable argument does 
not work because he does not explicitly 
distinguish between the qualitatively 
identical and numerically identical” 
seems to implicitly suggest that there 
is something wrong with implicit 
distinctions and that only explicit 
ones are valid. Besides it is another 
performative contradiction on the part 
of Wysocki who implicitly argues against 
implicit arguments, this is also generally 
diffi cult to understand what is wrong 
with implicit assumptions, provided 
they are correct; and obviously implicit 
distinction between the qualitatively 
identical and numerically identical is 
a correct one, as Wysocki himself admits. 
But then he says that “it is only 
because Dominiak out of the blue 
invokes the concept of numerical identity 
that his argument apparently invalidates 
the hypothesis that the original person 
lives in a sense in three host bodies. If 
we take DPA seriously, we can readily 
imagine that the original person’s 
genotype radiates into three host bodies 
and thus we could say that the original 
person is somehow qualitatively (in the 
relevant sense) or genetically identical 
with all of them. Dominiak’s victory is 
too easy because when he is apparently 
disproving DPA in Transplantation 
Thought Experiment he needs to picture 
the scenario in which there are at least 
two host bodies because then numerical 
identity will kick in and save the day”. 
Well, I would say that it is Wysocki’s 
victory that is too easy because he seems 
not to realise what is the main thrust 
of the above argument. The peculiar 
problem of DPA in its genetic version – 
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contrary to other physically anchored 
theories of identity like e.g. the Same 
Brain Account – is that genetic splits 
happen all the time – again, contrary 
to e.g. brain divisions – and that is why 
“the number of host bodies makes all 
the difference” in DPA. On the genetic 
version of DPA whatever happens, e.g 
you have a transplant, you lose your skin 
cells, you have blood transfusion etc., 
the identity multiplication is looming on 
the horizon. That is, inter alia, why DPA 
is so tenuous an account and this is why 
an argument from numerical identity 
works so well against it. This is therefore 
true, that “Dominiak’s resorting to the 
concept of numerical identity would 
actually disprove as illogical any scenario 
in which the original person splits into 
at least two identical (in any relevant 
sense) copies because the numerical 
identity would come in handy and would 
invalidate any one-to-many relations”. 
But the strength of this argument is 
enormous against DPA and virtually 
negligible against other accounts. 
Conclusions
Let me fi rst invite Wysocki to write 
a rejoinder to this rejoinder (to his 
original rejoinder). I can promise that 
if he does, it will be the last word in 
our debate – or at least as far as I am 
concerned. As to the present subject, 
I have to admit that there is a lot of 
valid remarks in Wysocki’s rejoinder. 
The problem is that it is diffi cult to see 
how these intelligent and learned ideas 
refer to Dominiak’s arguments. I am 
afraid they do not. They rather look like 
theoretical and argumentative snares 
which unfortunately for the hunter have 
too large nooses to catch this analytical 
fox. 
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